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Abstract—This paper addresses the design problem of false
data injection (FDI) attacks against the output tracking control
of networked systems, where the network-induced delays in the
feedback and forward channels are considered. The main contri-
butions of this paper are as follows: (i) To actively compensate for
the two-channel network-induced delays, a Kalman filter-based
networked predictive control scheme is designed for stochastic
linear discrete-time systems; (ii) From an attacker’s perspective,
stealthy FDI attacks are proposed for both the feedback and
forward channels so as to disrupt the stability of the resulting
closed-loop system while avoiding the detection of a Kalman
filter-based attack detector; (iii) Both numerical simulations and
practical experiments are carried out to show the effectiveness
of the proposed method.
Index Terms—False data injection attacks, networked control
systems (NCSs), network-induced delay, output tracking control,
predictive control, stability analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORKED control systems (NCSs) are control sys-tems in which the controller and the plant are connected
via communication networks, which have many merits such
as simple installation and maintenance, reduced weight and
power requirement, as well as high flexibility and reliabil-
ity. However, the introduction of networks into the control
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loop inevitably causes some adverse effects such as network-
induced delay and packet dropout, which may deteriorate
the system performance or even destabilize the closed-loop
system. Therefore, NCSs have become an active research topic
in the past decade [1]-[5].
Nowadays, NCSs have found numerous applications in vari-
ous fields such as process control, intelligent transportation, as
well as the measurement and control of critical infrastructures
(e.g., electricity, water, and gas distribution). In these systems,
measurement data and control commands travel through the
open and unprotected network, which are susceptible to be
corrupted by attackers [6]-[9]. For example, the typical mal-
wares such as Stuxnet and Duqu have been reported to disrupt
the control systems of critical infrastructures [10]. Such attacks
may significantly hamper the economy and environment, and
even endanger human lives. Therefore, the security of NCSs
is of paramount importance for various applications.
A. Related Work
Network attacks can be classified into two kinds: denial
of service (DoS) attacks and deception attacks [11]-[13]. The
DoS attacks aim to obstruct the transmission of data. To handle
them, some secure control schemes have been proposed in
[14]-[16]. Deception attacks are to compromise the integrity
of data, which are usually more subtle and stealthy than DoS
attacks. Typical deception attacks include data replay attacks
and false data injection (FDI) attacks. In [17] and [18], Mo
et al. analyzed the performance of the control system under
replay attacks, and provided model-based countermeasures to
improve the probability of attack detection.
The FDI attacks against the measurement data and control
commands are to a certain degree similar to sensor faults and
actuator faults, respectively. However, the faults are usually
assumed to be random and independent events with a fixed
failure rate probability. On the contrary, the FDI attacks can
be carefully designed by smart attackers so as to cause the
greatest possible damage without being detected, which thus
may result in more serious consequences. In this case, such
smart attacks would be difficult to detect by existing fault
detection techniques [19]-[21].
During the past five years, the FDI attacks have been paid
increasing attention. Mo et al. [22] proposed a simple FDI
attack model to compromise the sensors of a linear control
system. Manandhar et al. [23] showed that the FDI attack
in [22] could be detected by the proposed Euclidean-based
detector. Niu and Huie [24] analyzed the impact of the sensor
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FDI attack on the performance of the Kalman filter for linear
dynamic systems. Teixeira et al. [25] studied the cyber security
of state estimators in supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, and showed that undetectable FDI attacks could be
designed even when an attacker had limited resources. Kwon
et al. [26] gave the conditions under which the FDI attacks
on the sensors or/and actuators could fail the state estimators
while successfully bypassing the monitoring system.
As can be seen from the above, the studies on stealthy
FDI attacks are only in their embryonic stage. Furthermore, in
the aforementioned works [22]-[26], there exist some common
drawbacks: (i) All of them are not concerned with the network-
induced constraints although they are inevitable in practical
NCSs. (ii) In [22]-[25], only the FDI attacks on the mea-
surement data are considered, and in [26], although the FDI
attacks on both sensors and actuators are considered, only the
case of open-loop control is investigated. (iii) The theoretical
results in [22]-[26] are just tested by numerical simulation.
The foregoing three facts motivate the present study.
B. Contributions and Outline
The goal of this paper is to design the FDI attacks on the
measurement data in the feedback channel and the control
commads in the forward channel so as to destroy the output
tracking performance of NCSs without being detected. The
network-induced delays in the feedback and forward channels
are considered, and the predictive control scheme in [27] is
extended to solve the networked output tracking problem for
a stochastic linear system. It is assumed that the NCS is
equipped with a Kalman filter-based attack detector in the
controller. Then, we propose stealthy FDI attack models for
the two channels of the NCS to destabilize the closed-loop
system while successfully bypassing the attack detector.
Compared with the existing works on the FDI attacks [22]-
[26], the main advantages of this paper include the following
three aspects: (i) The two-channel network-induced delays are
considered, and then to compensate for them, a Kalman filter-
based networked predictive output tracking control (NPOTC)
scheme is designed; (ii) For the resulting closed-loop NCSs,
the stealthy FDI attacks are proposed for both the feedback
and forward channels, and thus the results derived in this paper
are more general than those in [22]-[26]; (iii) Beyond the
simulation verification, a Internet-based servo motor system is
constructed to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a Kalman
filter-based NPOTC scheme is proposed. Two-channel FDI
attacks and their effect on the resulting NPOTC system are
introduced in Section III. In Section IV, two-channel stealthy
FDI attack models are designed and the main results for
them are presented. Simulation and experimental results for
different attack scenarios are presented in Section V and VI,
respectively. Section VII concludes this paper.
Notation: The notations used here are fairly standard. ∆x(k)
is defined as ∆x(k) = x(k)−x(k−1). x(k+i|k) refers to the
ith-step-ahead predictive value of x(k) based on the data up to
time k. E(·) denotes the mathematical expectation operation.
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Fig. 1. NPOTC systems.
II. KALMAN FILTER-BASED NPOTC SYSTEMS
An NPOTC system is designed, as depicted in Fig. 1,
which consists of five parts: a physical plant, a data buffer
in the sensor, a communication network, a control prediction
generator in the controller, and a network delay compensator
in the actuator. Each part will be described in the following
subsections. It is assumed that the sensor and actuator are time-
driven and synchronous, while the controller is event-driven.
A. Physical Plant
Suppose that the physical plant in Fig. 1 is described by the
following linear system:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + ω(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + υ(k)
(1)
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the system state, u(k) ∈ Rm is the control
input, y(k) ∈ Rq is the measurement output, ω(k) ∈ Rn is the
system noise, and υ(k) ∈ Rq is the measurement noise. A, B,
and C are system matrices with appropriate dimensions. ω(k)
and υ(k) are the uncorrelated Gaussian white noises with
ω(k) ∼ N (0, Q) and υ(k) ∼ N (0, R)
where Q and R are the covariance matrices. It is assumed that
(A,C) is observable, (A,B) is controllable, and the matrix[
A− In B
C 0q×m
]
has full row rank.
The incremental form of (1) is
∆x(k + 1) = A∆x(k) +B∆u(k) + ∆ω(k)
∆y(k) = C∆x(k) + ∆υ(k).
(2)
Define the output tracking error
e(k) = r(k)− y(k) (3)
where r(k) ∈ Rq is the reference input. It is obtained from
(2) and (3) that
e(k + 1) =e(k)− CA∆x(k)− CB∆u(k) + ∆r(k + 1)
− C∆ω(k)−∆υ(k + 1).
(4)
From (2) and (4), we obtain the following augmented system:
xe(k + 1) = Aexe(k) +Be∆u(k) + Ee∆r(k + 1)
+We∆ω(k) + Ve∆υ(k + 1)
∆y(k) = Cexe(k) + ∆υ(k)
(5)
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where
xe(k) =
[
∆x(k)
e(k)
]
∈ Rn¯, Ae =
[
A 0n×q
−CA Iq
]
,
Be =
[
B
−CB
]
, Ee =
[
0n×q
Iq
]
, We =
[
In
−C
]
,
Ve =
[
0n×q
−Iq
]
, Ce =
[
C 0q×q
]
, n¯ = n+ q.
Thus, the output tracking problem of system (1) can be solved
by the feedback control of the augmented state xe(k).
B. Data Buffer
In general, the full state of the plant is not directly mea-
surable. To obtain the estimation of the state x(k) in the
controller, at each sampling instant k, the following data
Dk =
[
y(k)T u(k − 1)T R(k)T
]T
(6)
are transmitted to the controller together with the timestamp
k, where R(k)=[r(k)T r(k + 1)T · · · r(k + τ¯)T ]T .
C. Communication Network
The Ethernet-like network is considered in this paper. The
packets travel through the network from the sensor to the
controller and then from the controller to the actuator. As a
result, network-induced delays are inevitable during the packet
transmission, which are generally random with unknown dis-
tribution. In this paper, it is assumed that the round-trip time
(RTT) delay τk is bounded by τ¯ .
D. Control Prediction Generator
To obtain the state estimation xˆ(kc), the following Kalman
filter is usually used [18]:

Pkc|kc−1 = APkc−1A
T +Q
Kkc = Pkc|kc−1C
T (CPkc|kc−1C
T +R)−1
Pkc = (I −KkcC)Pkc|kc−1
xˆ(kc|kc − 1) = Axˆ(kc − 1) +Bu(kc − 1)
xˆ(kc) = xˆ(kc|kc − 1) +Kkc
(
y(kc)− Cxˆ(kc|kc − 1)
)
(7)
with the initial conditions
xˆ(0) = E
(
x(0)
)
, P0 = E
((
x(0)− xˆ(0)
)(
x(0)− xˆ(0)
)T)
where kc ≤ k is the timestamp of the following feedback data
available in the controller:
Dkc =
[
y(kc)
T u(kc − 1)
T R(kc)
T
]T
. (8)
Although the filter gain Kkc in (7) is time-varying, it usually
converges in a few steps [18]. Hence, K can be defined as
K , PCT (CPCT +R)−1 (9)
where P , limkc→∞ Pkc|kc−1, and thus the Kalman filter in
(7) is reduced to the following estimator with a fixed gain:{
xˆ(kc|kc − 1) = Axˆ(kc − 1) +Bu(kc − 1)
xˆ(kc) = xˆ(kc|kc − 1) +K
(
y(kc)− Cxˆ(kc|kc − 1)
)
.
(10)
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Fig. 2. NPOTC systems under two-channel FDI attacks.
The following state feedback control law is designed:
∆uˆ(kc|kc) = −Lxˆe(kc) (11)
where xˆe(kc) = [∆xˆ(kc)
T e(kc)
T ]T , and L ∈ Rm×n¯ is the
gain matrix. Then the predicted augmented states and control
increments from kc + 1 to kc + τ¯ are obtained as follows:
xˆe(kc + i|kc) =Aexˆe(kc + i− 1|kc) +Be∆uˆ(kc + i− 1|kc)
+ Ee∆r(kc + i)
(12)
∆uˆ(kc + i|kc) = −Lxˆe(kc + i|kc) (13)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , τ¯ , where xˆe(kc + i|kc) = [∆xˆ(kc +
i|kc)
T e(kc + i|kc)
T ]T , and xˆe(kc|kc) = xˆe(kc). Thus, we
obtain the following i-step control predictions:
uˆ(kc + i|kc) = uˆ(kc + i− 1|kc) + ∆uˆ(kc + i|kc) (14)
for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , τ¯ , where uˆ(kc−1|kc) = u(kc−1). Clearly,
Equation (14) yields the control prediction sequence
Ukc = [uˆ(kc|kc)
T uˆ(kc + 1|kc)
T · · · uˆ(kc + τ¯ |kc)
T ]T (15)
which is sent to the actuator together with the timestamp kc.
E. Network Delay Compensator
In the actuator, the network delay compensator is designed
to store the latest control prediction sequence and then use
it to control the plant. Without loss of generality, the latest
control prediction sequence at time k is expressed as
Uka = [uˆ(ka|ka)
T uˆ(ka + 1|ka)
T · · · uˆ(ka + τ¯ |ka)
T ]T (16)
where ka ≤ kc is the timestamp of Uka . Its RTT delay is
τk = k − ka. (17)
To compensate for the RTT delay, the following control signal
is chosen to control the plant at time k:
u(k) = uˆ(ka + τk|ka) = uˆ(k|k − τk). (18)
III. FDI ATTACKS AGAINST NPOTC SYSTEMS
It is assumed that the attacker is able to (i) read the data
transmitted through the feedback and forward channels and
modify them arbitrarily, and (ii) know the system parameters,
i.e., A, B, C, Q, and R. The objective of this paper is to design
stealthy FDI attacks on the feedback data and the control data
(see Fig. 2), i.e., Dkc in (8) and Uka in (16), such that the
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resulting NPOTC system becomes unstable while the two-
channel FDI attacks fail to be detected.
As shown in Fig. 2, under FDI attacks, the feedback data
arriving at the controller are assumed to be modified as
Dakc =
[
ya(kc)
T u(kc − 1)
T R(kc)
T
]T
(19)
with
ya(kc) = y(kc) + α(kc) (20)
where ya(kc) is the attacked output, and α(kc) is the feedback
channel attack. Similarly, the control data arriving at the
actuator are falsified by the attacker as
Uaaka = [uˆa(ka|ka)
T uˆa(ka + 1|ka)
T · · · uˆa(ka + τ¯ |ka)
T ]T
(21)
with
uˆa(ka + i|ka) = uˆ(ka + i|ka) + β(ka + i) (22)
for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , τ¯ , where uˆa(ka + i|ka) is the attacked
control prediction, and β(ka+i) is the forward channel attack.
Remark 1: It is noted that the FDI attacks in (20) and
(22) are respectively related to the timestamps of the packets
transmitted through the feedback and forward channels, i.e., kc
and ka. In the NPOTC system, the packet transmitted through
networks is with a timestamp. As a consequence, although the
measurement data and control data are randomly delayed in
their transmission due to the presence of random network-
induced delays, with the help of the timestamps, the FDI
attacks in (20) and (22) can still be easily designed.
To detect these FDI attacks, a general strategy is to deploy
a detector in the controller, as shown in Fig. 2. Here, an attack
detector is designed using the Kalman filter in (10) as well as
the feedback data Dakc in (19). Due to the presence of FDI
attacks, the Kalman filter in (10) becomes{
xˆa(kc|kc − 1) = Axˆa(kc − 1) +Bu(kc − 1)
xˆa(kc) = xˆa(kc|kc − 1) +K
(
ya(kc)− Cxˆa(kc|kc − 1)
)
(23)
where xˆa(kc) is the state estimation under attacks. Then, the
residual za(kc) is defined as
za(kc) = ya(kc)− yˆa(kc)
= ya(kc)− C
(
Axˆa(kc − 1) +Bu(kc − 1)
) (24)
where yˆa(kc) is the output estimation under attacks. If some
rough FDI attacks are performed in the feedback and forward
channels, they usually leads to a large value of ‖za(kc)‖,
which thus induces the detector to trigger an alarm.
If no attacks are injected into the NPOTC system, the
residual is
z(kc) = y(kc)− yˆ(kc)
= y(kc)− C
(
Axˆ(kc − 1) +Bu(kc − 1)
)
.
(25)
Lemma 1 [18]: The residual z(kc) in (25) is Gaussian
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and
covariance S = CPCT +R, i.e.,
z(kc) ∼ N (0, S). (26)
Under the FDI attacks in (20) and (22), the physical plant
is expressed as
xa(k + 1) = Axa(k) +B
(
u(k) + β(k)
)
+ ω(k)
y(k) = Cxa(k) + υ(k)
(27)
where xa(k) ∈ R
n is the system state under attacks. Equations
(11), (12), and (13) also become
∆uˆ(kc|kc) = −Lxˆea(kc) (28)
xˆea(kc + i|kc) =Aexˆea(kc + i− 1|kc)
+Be∆uˆ(kc + i− 1|kc) + Ee∆r(kc + i)
(29)
∆uˆ(kc + i|kc) = −Lxˆea(kc + i|kc) (30)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , τ¯ , where xˆea(kc + i|kc) = [∆xˆa(kc +
i|kc)
T ea(kc + i|kc)
T ]T , and xˆea(kc|kc) = xˆea(kc) =
[∆xˆa(kc)
T ea(kc)
T ]T with
ea(kc) = r(kc)− ya(kc). (31)
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the design of stealthy FDI
attacks in the feedback and forward channels for the NPOTC
system. The following definition is first given.
Definition 1: The NPOTC system is successfully attacked,
if the residual za(k) follows the same distribution as z(k), i.e.,
za(k) ∼ N (0, S) (32)
and for the constant reference input,
lim
k→∞
E
(
ea(k)
)
= 0 (33)
lim
k→∞
E
(
e(k)
)
=∞. (34)
In this paper, the feedback channel attack is designed as
α(k) = −y(k) + CAxˆa(k − 1) + CBu(k − 1) + ξ(k) (35)
where ξ(k)∼N (0, S) is the Gaussian white noise. It is clear
form (24)-(26) that the feedback channel attack in (35) always
satisfies the condition in (32), i.e.,
za(k) = ξ(k) ∼ N (0, S). (36)
Next, the attacked output tracking error ea(k) in (33) is
analyzed.
Theorem 1: Under the feedback channel FDI attack in (35),
limk→∞E
(
ea(k)
)
= 0 for the constant reference input if and
only if the eigenvalues of matrix Ae−BeL are within the unit
circle.
Proof: According to the network delay compensation
strategy in (18), it is obtained from (28) and (30) that
∆u(k) = ∆uˆ(k|k − τk) = −Lxˆea(k|k − τk) (37)
where
xˆea(k|k− τk) = Aexˆea(k− 1|k− τk)+Be∆uˆ(k− 1|k− τk).
(38)
Under the feedback channel attack in (35), from (20) we have
ya(k) = CAxˆa(k − 1) + CBu(k − 1) + ξ(k) (39)
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and then from (23) and (31), we obtain
∆xˆa(k + 1) = A∆xˆa(k) +B∆u(k) +K∆ξ(k + 1) (40)
ea(k + 1) = ea(k)−∆ya(k + 1)
= ea(k)− CA∆xˆa(k)− CB∆u(k)−∆ξ(k + 1).
(41)
The combination of (40) and (41) yields
E
(
xˆea(k + 1)
)
= AeE
(
xˆea(k)
)
+Be∆u(k) (42)
where xˆea(k) = [∆xˆa(k)
T ea(k)
T ]T . With (37), subtracting
(29) from (42) leads to the following equation:
E
(
xˆea(k + 1)
)
− xˆea(k + 1|k − τk)
=Ae
(
E
(
xˆea(k)
)
− xˆea(k|k − τk)
)
=Aτk+1e
(
E
(
xˆea(k − τk)
)
− xˆea(k − τk|k − τk)
)
=0
(43)
since xˆea(k − τk|k − τk) = xˆea(k − τk). That is,
xˆea(k|k − τk) = E
(
xˆea(k)
)
. (44)
Then (37) can be rewritten as
∆u(k) = −LE
(
xˆea(k)
)
. (45)
Thus, substituting (45) into (42) gives rise to
E
(
xˆea(k + 1)
)
= (Ae −BeL)E
(
xˆea(k)
)
. (46)
It is obvious from (46) that limk→∞E
(
ea(k)
)
= 0 if and only
if the eigenvalues of Ae −BeL are within the unit circle.
Finally, we analyze the real output tracking error e(k) in
(34) for the constant reference input. Under the feedback
channel attack in (35), it is obtained from (23) that
xˆa(k + 1) = Axˆa(k) +Bu(k) +Kξ(k + 1) (47)
Then from (27) and (47), we have
x˜a(k + 1) = xa(k + 1)− xˆa(k + 1)
= Ax˜a(k) +Bβ(k) + ω(k)−Kξ(k + 1).
(48)
In this paper, the forward channel attack is designed as
β(k + 1) = Fβ(k) (49)
where F ∈ Rm×m is the attack matrix. Combining (48) and
(49) yields
Xβ(k + 1) = ΛXβ(k) (50)
where
Xβ(k) =
[
E
(
x˜a(k)
)
β(k)
]
, Λ =
[
A B
0 F
]
.
Then from (3), (27), (31), (39), and (47), we have
E
(
e(k)
)
−E
(
ea(k)
)
= −CE
(
x˜a(k)
)
. (51)
Thus, we obtain
lim
k→∞
E
(
e(k)
)
= −C lim
k→∞
E
(
x˜a(k)
)
(52)
since limk→∞E
(
ea(k)
)
= 0 if the matrix Ae−BeL is stable.
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Fig. 3. RTT delays.
Obviously, the matrix Λ in (50) is a block upper triangular
matrix. It is well known that a block upper triangular linear
system is stable if and only if each block diagonal subsystem is
stable. Thus, it can be concluded from (50) and (52) that, with
the stable matrix Ae−BeL, if A is stable and F is unstable,
or if A is unstable, we will have limk→∞E
(
e(k)
)
= ∞.
Therefore, we can obtain the following main results:
Theorem 2: Under the feedback channel attack in (35) and
the forward channel attack in (49), the closed-loop NPOTC
system is stable and further E
(
e(∞)
)
= 0 if and only if the
matrices Ae −BeL, A, and F are stable.
Theorem 3: If the system matrix A is stable, the NPOTC
system can be attacked successfully without being detected by
injecting the feedback channel attack in (35) and the forward
channel attack in (49) with an unstable matrix F .
Theorem 4: If the system matrix A is unstable, the NPOTC
system can be attacked successfully without being detected by
injecting the feedback channel attack in (35) and any arbitrary
attack in the forward channel.
Remark 2: It is easy to observe from Theorems 3 and 4 that,
no matter whether the system matrix A is unstable or stable,
the control system can be attacked successfully without being
detected. While in [22] and [26], it is required that the matrix
A is unstable, where only the FDI attack on the sensor data
are considered. Therefore, in this paper, by performing two-
channel FDI attacks simultaneously, the derived results are
more general.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are carried out for
three cases: (i) A and F are stable; (ii) A is stable and F is
unstable; and (iii) A is unstable and F is stable. The network-
induced delays in two channels are considered, which lead to
0∼4 steps RTT delays shown in Fig. 3.
A. Case 1: A and F are Stable
Consider a stable system with matrices
A =

 0.2071 0.3705 0.04390.6072 0.5751 0.0272
0.6299 0.4514 0.3127

, B =

 0.1730 0.25230.9797 0.8757
0.2714 0.7373

,
C =
[
0.1365 0.8939 0.2987
0.0118 0.1991 0.6614
]
. (53)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS 6
        

 


  

  

  

  
  
  





 


   
 
   
 
(a) Residual za(k)
        

 

 
 
 







 

¡
¢


¡

£





¤  
 
¤  
 
¥
 

 
¥
 

 
(b) Attacked output response
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(c) Real output response
Fig. 4. Simulation results of Case 1.
With Q= 0.0001 and R= 0.01, by using the Kalman filter in
(7), we obtain the filter gain
K =

 0.0241 0.01710.0495 0.0323
0.0514 0.0434

 . (54)
By using the assignment of the closed-loop poles [0.6 ±
0.3j 0.2 0.1], the controller gain L is designed to be
L =
[
0.0244 −0.7056 −0.4480 −0.0840 1.5769
0.7696 1.1064 0.4683 −0.2284 −1.3080
]
.
(55)
The feedback channel attack in (35) as well as the forward
channel attack in (49) with β(50) = [10 10]T and the stable
matrix
F =
[
0.0579 0.8132
0.3529 0.0099
]
(56)
are injected into the NPOTC system at time k = 50. The
simulation result is shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the
attacked output ya(k) track well the reference signal r(k), and
the real output y(k) also ultimately converges to r(k) with
the diminishment of the forward channel attack β(k), which
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(b) Real output response
Fig. 5. Simulation results of Case 2.
coincides with the result of Theorem 2. Furthermore, the two-
channel attacks cannot be detected by using the residual za(k)
in Fig. 4(a).
B. Case 2: A is Stable and F is Unstable
Consider the same stable system as Case 1 with the same
K and L. The feedback channel attack in (35) as well as the
forward channel attack in (49) with β(50) = [10 10]T and the
unstable matrix
F =
[
0.9501 0.6068
0.2311 0.4860
]
(57)
are injected into the NPOTC system at time k = 50. The
simulation result is shown in Fig. 5. It can be seen that the
attacked output ya(k) still track well the reference signal r(k),
but the real output y(k) ultimately diverges from r(k), which
coincides with the result of Theorem 3.
C. Case 3: A is Unstable and F is Stable
Consider an unstable system with matrix
A =

 0.2312 0.6724 0.56300.4161 0.9383 0.1189
0.2988 0.3431 0.1690

 (58)
and matrices B and C in (53). Using the same design
procedure as Case 1, the matrices K and L are obtained as
K =

 0.2740 0.12740.3267 0.1502
0.1627 0.0813

 (59)
L =
[
0.0506 0.8601 0.3087 −0.5182 2.0070
0.4128 0.0181 −0.2153 0.1520 −1.5753
]
.
(60)
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(a) Attacked output response
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(b) Real output response
Fig. 6. Simulation results of Case 3.
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Fig. 7. Internet-based servo motor system.
The feedback channel attack in (35) as well as the forward
channel attack in (49) with β(50) = [10 10]T and the stable
matrix in (56) are injected into the NPOTC system at time
k = 50. The simulation result is shown in Fig. 6. It can be
seen that the attacked output ya(k) still track well the reference
signal r(k). Although the injected forward channel attack β(k)
is convergent, the closed-loop system still becomes unstable,
which coincides with the result of Theorem 4.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To further test the proposed method, an Internet-based servo
motor system test rig has been constructed, as shown in Fig.
7. It consists mainly of a servo motor system, a networked
controller, a local control board, as well as the Internet from
the Tsinghua University, Beijing, China to the University of
South Wales, Pontypridd, UK. The RTT delays of the Internet
vary randomly from 3 to 8 steps. For the details of the
experimental setup, refer to [27].
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(b) Real output response
Fig. 8. Experimental results of Case 1.
Our objective is to control the position of the servo motor
system. With the sampling period 0.04s, the model of the servo
motor system is identified as
A =

 1.2998 −0.4341 0.13431 0 0
0 1 0

, B =

 10
0

,
C =
[
3.5629 2.7739 1.0121
]
. (61)
whose input and output are the control voltage (−10V to 10V)
and the angle position (-120o∼120o), respectively. The filter
gain K and the controller gain L are chosen as
K =
[
0.1070 0.0877 0.0178
]T
(62)
L =
[
0.7125 −0.2593 0.1253 −0.0245
]
. (63)
From (61), we know that the servo motor system is open-loop
critically stable. In the following, practical experiments are
performed for two cases: (i) F is stable and (ii) F is unstable.
A. Case 1: F is Stable
The feedback channel attack in (35) as well as the forward
channel attack in (49) with the initial value β(199) = 2 and
the stable matrix F = 0.99 are injected into the NPOTC
system at time t = 7.96s. The experimental result is shown
in Fig. 8, which indicates that the attacked output ya(k) track
well the reference signal r(k), but the real position of the
servo motor deviates from the reference signal r(k). With
the disappearance of the forward channel attack β(k), the
servo motor finally stops at a certain position rather than the
reference signal r(k).
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Fig. 9. Experimental results of Case 2.
B. Case 2: F is Unstable
The feedback channel attack in (35) as well as the forward
channel attack in (49) with the initial value β(180) = 0.1 and
the unstable matrix F = 1.02 are injected into the NPOTC
system at time t = 7.20s. The experimental result is shown
in Fig. 9. It is clear that the two-channel attacks lead to the
instability of the closed-loop control system.
It should be pointed out that in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 9(a),
when the two-channel attacks are added, slight fluctuations
occur on the attacked output ya(k), which do not appear in
the aforementioned numerical simulations. This phenomenon
results from the mismatch between the model in (61) and the
practical servo motor system.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the design problem of FDI at-
tacks against the output tracking control of networked systems.
To compensate for two-channel network-induced delays, a
Kalman filter-based NPOTC method has been proposed for
stochastic linear systems. Then from an attacker’s viewpoint,
the stealthy FDI attacks have been designed for the measure-
ment data in the feedback channel and the control data in the
forward channel, which can avoid being detected by a Kalman
filter-based detector. Both simulation and experimental results
have illustrated the effectiveness of the proposed method.
It is worth mentioning that, in general, the research on FDI
attacks includes three aspects: attack design, attack detection,
and secure control design. This paper mainly focuses on the
first aspect, i.e., the design of stealthy FDI attacks. The rest
two aspects are more important and interesting, which thus
deserve further investigation in our future research.
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